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Regionalism, Politics and Canadian Unity 
in the Age of a Global Economy 
CANADA IS A COUNTRY OF REGIONS existing in a global economy. Atlantic 
Canada, Western Canada, Quebec, Ontario, the North: each constitutes a distinct 
variable in the national equation. We even talk of sub-regions, that is regions within 
regions, such as the Acadian Peninsula of New Brunswick and Pictou County of 
Nova Scotia. At the same time, the world is rushing headlong towards a single 
economy predicated on the ideology of free trade and its concomitants, 
privatization and deregulation. Indeed, I often wonder what holds Canada together, 
what keeps it from fracturing along linguistic, economic and geographic lines, and 
increasingly, what will keep Canada from altogether succumbing to the voracious 
appetite of the global economy. There is no single counterweight to the forces of 
regionalism and globalization. Rather there is a series of counterweights, or a 
continuum if you will: the specificity of the federal dollar marks one endpoint, the 
vagueness of patriotism the other. 
Four recent books explore, to varying degrees, the twin themes of regionalism 
and unity. The political journalist Jeffrey Simpson argues that patronage need not 
be a matter of appointing cronies, hacks and bagmen, but that if used judiciously 
patronage can serve a greater national purpose, the bridging of linguistic, cultural 
and regional differences. For his part, political scientist Herman Bakvis 
demonstrates that reports on the death of the regional minister have been greatly 
exaggerated. In the interest of national unity, prime ministers still rely on ministers 
who will represent regional interests in cabinet. The regional development 
specialist Donald Savoie summarizes, with fantastic attention to detail, Ottawa's 
efforts to foster national unity through regional economic development. And finally, 
Senator Heath Macquarrie's wonderful memoirs reveal, among other things, a 
prime minister who has presided over the neo-conservative transformation not only 
of his own party but also of his country. Read together these four authors offer a 
eulogy of sorts: a eulogy to a nation that for 125-odd years has beaten the odds, that 
has at once survived and prospered despite both internal and external pressures. In 
the brave new world of efficiency and competitiveness, the counterweights of 
patronage, regional ministers and regional development policies are doomed. 
Confederation represented not the logical expression of an emerging 
nationalism, but a masterful example of political expediency. Nowhere is this more 
evident than in the relationship between Sir John A. Macdonald and Joseph Howe, 
journalist, politician and leading voice of Nova Scotia's anti-Confederate 
movement. Between 1866 and 1868 Howe resisted Confederation, inveighing 
against what he saw as the tragic loss of Nova Scotia's sovereignty. Macdonald, 
that consummate politician and wily tactician, simply waited for Howe to exhaust 
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himself and accept the inevitability of Confederation, at which point he dipped into 
the federal treasury for financial compensation to Nova Scotia, appointed Howe to 
his cabinet and granted him significant powers over the dispensation of patronage. 
Lo and behold, the Conservative Party was competitive in Nova Scotia within a 
decade. "Patronage", writes Jeffrey Simpson, "was crucial to [Macdonald's] long 
game in Nova Scotia. It was always central to his conception of power, 
party-building and, ultimately, nation-building" (p. 76). In other words, patronage 
can serve a higher, more noble purpose than the rewarding of friends and the 
awarding of contracts to generous corporate donors. 
In Spoils of Power, The Politics of Patronage (Toronto, Collins, 1988) the 
peripatetic Simpson travels from Newfoundland to British Columbia, from the 
corridors of power to the chambers of the judiciary, and from the struggles for 
responsible government to the tribulations of Brian Mulroney. At each destination 
he discovers skeletons in the closet of just about every politician. Macdonald's dirty 
dealings in the Pacific Scandal and Trudeau 's bevy of pay-offs to party re-treads in 
1984 come to mind. By the end of the book, greased palms, kickback schemes and 
influence-peddling have become a leitmotif in Canadian political culture. Indeed, 
patronage is now a social metaphor for much that is wrong with society: the 
triumph of mediocrity, the vindication of avarice and the overall cheapening of the 
political process. Yet, at the same time, Simpson unearths the too often neglected 
integrative role that patronage played, and continues to play, in our historical 
development. If used judiciously patronage can serve an important purpose: the 
integration of Canada's disparate regions and heterogeneous population. To quote 
Simpson: "Patronage, by offering benefits to people in all regions, has helped to 
steer Canada away from parties based on race, religion or region, which would have 
led to unstable coalition governments. Patronage, whatever its costs, has done its bit 
for national integration and political stability" (p. 16). 
New Brunswick offers telling examples of both the egregious abuse, and 
prescient use, of patronage. The 1980 trial of Conservative fundraiser Francis 
Atkinson revealed a party financing scheme as corrupt as it was unsophisticated: 
"In Atkinson's files lay memoranda, letters, notes, bank accounts, cheques, 
telephone messages — in short the whole documentary record of what is known as 
tollgating: the return to the party in power of a fixed percentage of contracts 
awarded by the government" (p. 186). Indeed, the Atkinson affair offends even the 
most cynical political veteran. Nonetheless, Premier Frank McKenna is not 
speaking out of both sides of his mouth when he simultaneously condemns the 
abuse of power and condones patronage as "a way of life in New Brunswick" (p. 
194). Rather, he rightly recognizes that if used wisely and honestly patronage can 
bridge the gulf between New Brunswick's French and English communities, that an 
appointment can advance the cause of marginalized groups and encourage 
participation in the political process. 
Hindsight, however, reveals just how premature some of Simpson's 
observations were. For example, he claims that in Ontario David Peterson and his 
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top adviser, Gordon Ashworth, used the premier's powers of appointment with 
"subtlety and finesse" (p. 220). The 1989 Patricia Starr scandal which rocked the 
otherwise sanguine Ontario Liberals can be called many things, but subtle is not 
one of them.1 As for finesse, Ashworth resigned when he found himself in a 
political compromise of picayune proportions: he had accepted a free refrigerator 
from, and had his house painted by, a company seeking government business. 
Likewise, Simpson observes that as one moves from east to west the abuse of 
patronage markedly decreases. To be fair, however, no one could have predicted the 
depths to which Bill Vander Zalm and his Social Credit government would sink. 
Nonetheless, Spoils of Power is exceptionally well-written, intelligent and 
thoughtful. Simpson is neither jaded nor naive. While abhorring the blatant abuse of 
a government's prerogative, he contends that patronage can play a constructive role 
in a country as diverse as Canada. 
Herman Bakvis' examination of the regional minister in the federal cabinet is 
also rooted in an appreciation for the challenges posed by Canada's diversity, a 
diversity so profound that the federal government cannot even impose a cigarette 
tax without ruffling regional feathers. In an effort to curb the illegal yet lucrative 
re-entry of Canadian cigarettes into Canada the federal cabinet introduced, on 12 
February 1992, a $l-per-pack export tax. By narrowing the price differential 
between cigarettes destined for the Canadian market and cigarettes destined for the 
U.S. market — cigarettes not subject to federal and provincial taxes — the 
government hoped to dissuade both cross-border shoppers and large-scale 
smugglers. The law, however, contained one curious loophole: Newfoundland 
fishermen would be exempt from the new tax. Some fishermen, it seems, were in 
the practice of taking cases of Canadian-made cigarettes outside of Canada's 
territorial waters at which point the voyage ranks as foreign, and the cigarettes are 
thus exempted from Canadian taxes, taxes which account for two-thirds of the price 
of a pack of cigarettes. Upon returning to port the fishermen sold their cigarettes at 
a significantly lower price than the corner store but at a significantly higher price 
than they originally paid. And this is why, in order to guarantee the comparative 
advantage of his constituents, John Crosbie secured an exemption from the new 
$l-per-pack export tax. When asked to explain the loophole, an aide to one inner 
cabinet minister stated quite unequivocally: "It was one of those political things, 
you know, regional interests to protect".2 Indeed, every prime minister from Sir 
John A. Macdonald to Brian Mulroney has appreciated the importance of giving 
regional representatives a seat at the cabinet table. 
In his new book, Regional Ministers, Power and Influence in the Canadian 
Cabinet (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1992) Herman Bakvis explores the 
role of the regional minister, its nuances, caveats and constants, from 1867 to the 
1 Dubbed Pattigate by the media, the scandal revealed that Patricia Starr had funnelled charity funds 
from the Toronto section of the National Council of Jewish Women to the coffers of various provincial 
and federal politicians. Under the federal Income Tax Act it is illegal for charities to make political 
donations. 
2 The Globe and Mail, 22 May 1992, p. A6. The federal government has since dropped the $l-per-pack 
export tax altogether. 
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present. Both Macdonald and Laurier relied on strong regional representation in 
their various cabinets: Joseph Howe of Nova Scotia, George-Etienne Cartier and 
Hector-Louis Langevin of Quebec, and Clifford Sifton of everywhere west of 
Ontario, all enjoyed tremendous power over patronage, and influence in the making 
of regional policy. Yet, and this was their strength, "regional ministers of the period 
tended to be lukewarm in pressing provincial or broader regional interests. Instead, 
their focus tended to be a combination of local and national issues" (p. 37). This 
became all but impossible during Robert Borden's tenure as prime minister. The 
Naval Bill, conscription crisis and the nascent Progressive movement precluded any 
combination of local and national issues. It took the tremendous negotiating skills 
of a Mackenzie King to eventually fashion a federal cabinet with strong regional 
representation: Ernest Lapointe established himself as a Quebec lieutenant of 
remarkable dexterity and longevity whilst Charles Dunning, Robert Forke and T.A. 
Crerar represented the West. From 1935 onwards, Jimmy Gardiner and CD. Howe 
emerged as regional kingpins of unprecedented and, for that matter, unsurpassed 
proportions. Despite King's ability to create an atmosphere of collegiality around 
the cabinet table, the Maritimes were effectively marginalized. J.L. Ilsley, J.L. 
Ralston, and Angus L. Macdonald were never able to match Howe's clout. 
Louis St. Laurent, John Diefenbaker and Lester Pearson presided over the 
transformation of the regional minister. Against the backdrop of a burgeoning 
bureaucracy and the advent of new forms of political mobilization — that is, mass 
communication and sophisticated polling techniques — the power and influence of 
the regional minister steadily waned. Prime ministers continued to name regional 
representatives to the cabinet, but these ministers lacked the means to pursue 
regional ends. The mandarins — Jack Granatstein's "Ottawa Men"— usurped 
powers formerly wielded by the minister, while television offered the prime 
minister greater visibility and the opportunity to communicate more directly with 
Canadians. Moreover, the locus of decision-making was shifting away from the 
cabinet table to federal-provincial conferences. 
Pierre Trudeau's meteoric rise to the top precipitated a further decline in the 
role of the regional minister. An individual of profound intellectual strength, 
Trudeau sought to rationalize the decision-making process so that decisions would 
be premised on economic facts and national considerations rather than political and 
partisan emotions. At the same time, Trudeau recognized the fact of regionalism 
and thus established four regional desks in the PMO and created the Department of 
Regional Economic Expansion. The Liberals' poor showing in the 1972 election 
forced Trudeau to reassess the thorny question of regionalism. To this end, he 
abolished the regional desks and appointed 10 regional ministers, giving them 
increased authority over patronage and political matters. 
By the 1980s, the regional minister had returned. The term region, however, 
needs qualification: ministers increasingly concerned themselves not with, say, 
Atlantic Canada, but with their province and, even more precisely, their 
constituency. Bakvis very effectively reveals the extent to which Romeo LeBlanc, 
Allan MacEachen, Donald Jamieson and Lloyd Axworthy funnelled federal money 
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into their constituencies in an effort to increase their visibility and better their 
chances of re-election. Indeed, Bakvis devotes two exceptionally insightful chapters 
to Axworthy and his almost unbelievable ability to mobilize the resources of his 
portfolio for the protection of his precarious hold on Winnipeg-Fort Garry. Bakvis 
writes, "despite seeing himself as western lieutenant, Axworthy was a regional 
minister in a very narrow sense: his accomplishments, significant to be sure, 
accrued primarily to a few square miles of downtown Winnipeg" (p. 236).3 
His initial reluctance notwithstanding, Brian Mulroney developed a cabinet of 
regional ministers two years into his mandate. He disbanded the Provincial 
Advisory Committees and appointed ten regional ministers giving them power over 
patronage. He terminated the Department of Regional Industrial Expansion, and 
created regional development agencies, most notably the Atlantic Canada 
Opportunities Agency. He formally designated a Quebec lieutenant — although he 
undoubtedly came to regret his choice of Lucien Bouchard. And, through sheer 
force of personality, John Crosbie emerged as a fierce advocate of Newfoundland's 
interests. Crosbie embodies the regional minister of Trudeau's cabinet, but his 
perspective extends beyond his constituency to include everything from the 
$l-per-pack export tax on cigarettes to the billion-dollar Hibernia mega-project. 
Crosbie also made his weight felt in the Canada-France fisheries treaty, normally 
the domain of External Affairs. "In many ways", concludes Bakvis, "the Mulroney 
cabinet is testimony to the continuity and durability of the regional minister system 
in Canadian political life; and in certain respects it represents a return to the less 
troubled Mackenzie King period: that is, a limited number of major figures 
dominate large regions and operate within a system in which a premium is placed 
on brokerage-based connections and transactions" (p. 275). 
I found Regional Ministers to be an eloquent and very detailed retelling of the 
obvious: prime ministers, albeit with varying degrees of success, respect Canada's 
abiding regionalism when making cabinet appointments. Nevertheless, Bakvis 
deserves credit for collecting a great amount of information and turning it into a 
very readable text. Also, Bakvis casts light on some of the shortcomings inherent in 
the idea of the regional minister. As he notes, the cabinet table may not be the best 
place for regional representation in Ottawa. To be sure, it is in the best interest of 
regions to have a strong voice at the cabinet table but this is not always possible: 
the Maritimes lacked effective representation throughout the King years while the 
West — Winnipeg-Fort Garry notwithstanding — suffered a similar fate throughout 
the Trudeau years. Moreover, the regional minister system is too dependent on too 
many variables: personality, electoral vulnerability and the adequacy of ministerial 
candidates available to the prime minister. Further, Bakvis points out that regional 
development agencies such as ACOA become ministerial porkbarrels wherein 
funding allocation is predicated on political, rather than economic, arguments. All 
3 For an alternative spin on the Axworthy phenomenon, see Lloyd Axworthy, "Regional Development: 
Innovations in the West", in Pierre Trudeau and Tom Axworthy, eds., Towards a Just Society: The 
Trudeau Years (Toronto, 1990). 
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told, we require more effective regional representation in Ottawa. We also require a 
different approach to the problem of regional disparities. 
A friend of mine wrote his undergraduate thesis on the Maritimes and the 
Depression. He often quipped that, while he enjoyed his research, he was having a 
hard time finding a cut-off date. Regional underdevelopment is as persistent and 
contentious a theme as any in Canada's political economy. Anyone who attempts to 
both explain and prescribe solutions to underdevelopment merits our 
congratulations, and condolences. Congratulations because regional under-
development is a massive, theoretically difficult subject, and condolences because 
regional underdevelopment seems intractable. Enter Donald Savoie, scholar, 
consultant, intellectual force behind ACOA and author of Regional Economic 
Development, Canada's Search for Solutions, 2nd edition (Toronto, University of 
Toronto Press, 1992). 
Divided into three parts, Regional Economic Development documents the 
conflicting theories of regional underdevelopment, chronicles the past 30 years of 
government efforts to ameliorate disparities and, finally, offers an assessment of 
these efforts and suggests prospects for future efforts. In chapter 1, Savoie cursorily 
summarizes theories of regional underdevelopment. At one point he states, in 
cavalier fashion, that the "development approach...inspired by the study of 
underdeveloped countries...has fallen out of favour in Canada among both students 
and practitioners of regional development" (p.7). I am not persuaded by his easy 
dismissal of an important stream of Canadian scholarship. Moreover, I think that 
Regional Economic Development would have been a better book had Savoie been 
more forthright about the theoretical underpinning to his own understanding of 
regional disparity and development, past government policy and appropriate 
policies for the future. For the most part he eschews theory, though he re-opens the 
theoretical can of worms in the penultimate chapter wherein he proposes — but 
does not fully elaborate — the clinical approach. "A central feature of the clinical 
approach", he writes, "is that what is required in one region may not be required in 
another" (p. 230). 
Part II traces in minute detail government forays into the world of regional 
economic development. Although a useful reference for researchers, it reads like 
the Old Testament: ARDA begat DREE, DREE begat DRIE, and DRIE begat 
ACOA, WD, FEDNOR and DIST. Particularly distressing is the fact that so many 
government efforts have been a fumble in the dark, that is, conducted on a largely 
hit and miss, trial and error basis. Chapter 9, "ACOA — Looking East", might have 
provided insight into why this was. Yet it is so self-referential it is almost 
post-modern: Savoie the academic analyzing the accomplishments of Savoie the 
regional development consultant. The resultant lack of candor and detachment is 
therefore not surprising. For example Savoie alludes to, but does not adequately 
address, ACOA's shortcomings, especially its politicization. 4 
4 Joe Ghiz once described ACOA as "a political slush fund designed to get the PC Party through the 
1988 federal election". Quoted in Paul Stothart, "A Triple E Strategy For Atlantic Growth", Policy 
Options/Options Politiques (September 1991) p. 13. See also Bakvis, Regional Ministers, pp. 254-5. 
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Savoie does, however, make one encouraging observation. In chapter 11 he 
argues that governments should seriously re-evaluate the policy of giving cash 
grants and tax incentives to prospective investors. Evidence suggests that such 
handouts are ineffective in that they do not stimulate lasting economic 
development.5 In fact, direct government assistance to investors seeking to locate in 
slow growth regions represents private profit at public expense. Further, there is 
nothing more disconcerting to watch than the business class, in pursuit of the 
sweetest offer, playing off sycophantic politicians against each other.6 
Savoie 's concluding section provides an assessment of government efforts and 
suggests options for the future. Regrettably, his conclusions are stale and 
uninspiring: "The importance of defining clear and realistic regional development 
objectives can hardly be overemphasized" (p. 240), and "Before governments look 
to [development] programs, they should resolve to cooperate far more than they 
have in the past" (p. 252), and "One issue that should not be overlooked is that of 
federal visibility...[the federal government] should get proper credit for its efforts" 
(p. 254). Savoie concludes by arguing that regional development agencies ought to 
be divided into two units. One unit would allocate the funds and report to 
Parliament. The other unit would "work at arm's length...to define regional 
development strategies, to ensure that governments stick to the development themes 
found in the strategies [and] to evaluate the performance of governments in 
implementing the strategies" (p. 265). Facilitating government co-operation, 
ensuring federal visibility and tinkering with ACOA might very well mitigate 
errors, overlap and animosity. But what is required is a fundamentally new 
approach to regional economic development, an approach premised on economic 
democracy, community-based development and co-operativism. 
My greatest criticism of Regional Economic Development stems not so much 
from what Savoie says but from what he does not say. His approach to the Free 
Trade Agreement and to the emerging global economy is at best perfunctory. As 
governments embrace the ideology of neo-classical economics and commit 
themselves to privatization and deregulation we must ask ourselves: will there be 
the necessary tools for regional development policies? Savoie asserts, "The 
issue...is not //"governments will intervene, but rather how they will intervene" (p. 
250). I harbour neither his optimism nor his naivete. Because as governments 
concede economic powers to international fora, and as the locus of power shifts 
from cabinet tables to corporate boardrooms, regional economic policies will prove 
impossible. When read against the backdrop of the enormous changes occurring in 
the global economy, Regional Economic Development is badly out of date. 
But if Savoie's book is out of date, then Heath Macquarrie's memoirs offer in 
part a timely, if disheartening, examination of Mulroney's conservatism, or more 
precisely, his neo-conservatism. "Because I worry about our current sense of 
5 Savoie, Regional Economic Development, pp. 178-85. See also, The Globe and Mail: "At Rope's end, 
defiant workers stage rebellion: Determined Cape Bretoners blockade plant in bid to stop U.S. buyer 
from removing machinery", 28 September 1992, p. A6. 
6 For an insightful and lively discussion of this phenomenon see, Robert B. Reich, "Who Is Them?", 
Harvard Business Review (March/April 1991) 
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values", Macquarrie writes, "I've called these candid memoirs Red Tory Blues" 
(p.ix). 
In January of 1935 Prime Minister R.B. Bennett delivered a series of five radio 
addresses in which he appealed to the hearts and minds of Canadians: "...if you 
believe that in Big Business, that in capitalism, there are abuses which work 
hardship upon the people of this country, if you believe that the faults of capitalism 
have brought about injustices in our social state, if you believe that these injustices 
manifest themselves in lower wages and too high costs of living and 
unemployment,—then support my party". At least one person, a young teenager in 
Victoria, Prince Edward Island, listened with "rapt attention and sympathetic 
vibrations...I can still hear Bennett's sonorous cadences bursting from the de Forrest 
Crossley radio in our Victoria home" (pp. 1, 23). So began Heath Macquarrie's 
nearly 60-year involvement with the Conservatives, the Progressive Conservatives 
and now, the neo-Conservatives. 
Red Tory Blues, A Political Memoir (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 
1992) moves chronologically, from the 1930 all-candidates meeting in the Victoria 
Town Hall to the Canadian Senate. Along the way Macquarrie remembers the days 
of Bennett, Manion, Meighen, Bracken and Port Hope; he examines in poignant 
detail the troubled tenure of Diefenbaker and Dalton Camp's divisive, painful 
struggle to depose him; he reviews the leadership of Robert Stanfield, whom he 
calls the best prime minister we almost had; he recalls the hapless Joe Clark years; 
and he studies the arrival of the boy from Baie Comeau, whom he supported in 
1976, and whom he now considers to be more right-wing than Preston Manning. As 
well, Macquarrie recounts his numerous peregrinations to New York, the 
Caribbean, Europe, India, the Middle East, and what was the Soviet Union. As a 
political organizer, Member of Parliament, Senator and world traveller, Macquarrie 
knows the vicissitudes of political life, and as a master storyteller he is able to retell 
his experiences with wit, charm and pith. He is as at ease discussing the complex 
realities of the Middle East as he is discussing his relationship with Isabel Stewart, 
his wife of 43 years. 
I very much enjoyed Macquarrie's insights into the Diefenbaker years, an 
absolutely fascinating period in Canadian history. Although prone to hyperbole — 
"In a little over three months [Diefenbaker's 1957] Parliament passed a spate of 
legislation of immense benefit to the people of Canada" (p. 158) — Macquarrie 
offers revealing glimpses into Diefenbaker 's caucus and into his psyche. He 
explores his antipathy for Léon Balcer, a man who could have helped him with the 
Quebec question; and, he looks at the Chief's inability to reconcile the opposing 
views of Howard Green and Douglas Harkness. Writes Macquarrie, "I found 
[Diefenbaker] vain, suspicious to the point of paranoia, and extremely difficult to 
converse with no matter the subject" (p. 179). Macquarrie's retelling of Dalton 
Camp's successful machination to rid the party of its leader remains by far the most 
entertaining section of Red Tory Blues. It is political drama at its best. 
Diefenbaker's candidacy in the subsequent leadership convention was a pathetic 
sight — "It was all really very sad" (p.223). 
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There are times, however, when Red Tory Blues could have benefited from 
more sustained analysis. I appreciate that Macquarrie was writing his memoirs and 
not a political treatise. But he occasionally borders on the glib. Walter Gordon's 
1963 budget merits more explanation than, "In content as well as in its conception 
the Gordon budget was a wretched fiasco" (p.200). Likewise, his statement 
regarding the collapse of the Soviet Union is unbearably sententious. "The opening 
to capitalism and the free market is exciting. It is wonderful to have a wide range of 
exotic consumer goods but, if only a miniscule portion of the population can afford 
them, have we achieved the just society" (p.303). In point of fact, the free market is 
not all it's cracked up to be, certainly not for the permanent underclass. And to 
equate conspicuous consumption with social justice leads me to wonder, what kind 
of Red Tory is Macquarrie? 
While Macquarrie led an interesting life, his memoirs are unsettling. Red Tory 
Blues contains an unspoken but palpable sadness: the death of the Progressive 
Conservative Party of Canada. The grand old party of Sir John A. Macdonald has 
become the Grand Old Party of Brian Mulroney: 
It seems to me that the present PC government has forgotten that an essential 
part of Canadian nationalism has been founded on a belief that mere 
imitation of the American way of life was an insufficient and erroneous way 
of expressing our national identity. To a large degree we share a great 
continent with the Americans. We are like them, but we are different. John A. 
Macdonald knew that. So did Robert Borden. Bennett, as he said at the 
Charlottetown meeting in 1935, most certainly did. John Diefenbaker did not 
wish to subsume our way of life under Americanism. I have an uneasy 
feeling that our present leader Brian Mulroney has no pulse for this kind of 
classic Canadianism (p.347). 
Even more pernicious is Mulroney's blind commitment to neo-classical economics. 
A nefarious ideology predicated on the power of the almighty market, neo-classical 
economics will ultimately transform the welfare state into a security state, a state 
that serves as a line of defence for the rich against the poor. In such a world, the 
integrative power of patronage, the unifying presence of regional ministers and 
regional development policies will all be for naught. 
What, then, is to be done? In the new global economy where people, 
communities and even nation-states count for very little, fatalism is a not 
unexpected reaction. After all, the Fredericton Anti-Poverty Organization will never 
stop Exxon from polluting the world and exploiting labour. But thousands of 
grass-root organizations like FAPO might be able to have some effect. In other 
words, people must organize, resist and insist that their local, regional and national 
communities matter, that they deserve a clean environment, that they have a right to 
participate in decisions that affect their lives. A politicized citizenry offers perhaps 
the most important counterweight to globalization. 
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